The present period of economic globalization originated following World War II. Given the strongly protectionist tendencies prevailing at the time, how did this happen? Structural economic and military causes, along with intervening coalitional and institutional factors, are considered. Trade policy change is examined in the five largest trading economies-Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the United States. Structural economic causes best explain why protectionist tendencies were so strong, and why they were weakest in the United States and the Federal Republic. The liberalizing trend inaugurated in the United States and the Federal Republic was also facilitated by coalitional side payments to agriculture. Cold War-related military interests appear to have been the strongest impetus behind the unilateral form of the liberalization.
T oday, economic globalization carries an aura of inevitability. But at the end of World War II, few predicted that the world economy was about to embark on a long run of intensifying international trade and investment. 1 Following two world wars and the Depression, international trade and finance had been in retreat for decades, and protectionist forces seemed dominant in all the major economies. National governments seemed bent on heavily restricting international economic transactions to preserve economic stability and fuller employment. As a result, the Bretton Woods institutions appeared stillborn, rendered irrelevant by highly restrictive trade and exchange control regimes (Triffin, 1957) . How did the strong globalization trends and interests we see today manage to put down roots in such an inhospitable environment?
Here this question will be approached by looking at how international trade policies developed after World War II in the five largest trading economies-those of Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Japan, and the United States. 2 There are two basic explanatory approaches in the international trade policy literature. One emphasizes endogenous tariff formation in response to the changing relative size and political power of protectionist and free-trading interest groups (Gerschenkron, 1989; Gourevitch, 1986; Rogowski, 1987) . Another emphasizes how military externalities of trade can lead countries to modify trade policies in an effort to strengthen allies or to strengthen themselves relative to their enemies (Gowa, 1994; Hirschman, 1980) . Structural and military changes interact with initial conditions, broader public opinion, and mediating domestic and international political processes to produce trade policy outcomes. Countries with more evenly matched protectionist and free-trading sectoral coalitions in the prewar period are more likely to see their postwar trade policies decisively changed. Two relevant aspects of the political process are coalition formation (Esping-Andersen, 1985; Horowitz, 2002; Luebbert, 1991) and institutional concentration of power (Haggard & Kaufman, 1992; Tsebelis, 1995) . Horse trading may alter sectoral coalitions from the relatively neat split that often exists between free-trading and protectionist sectors. Domestic political institutions may divide or concentrate power in a way that strengthens or weakens the influence of sectoral economic interests relative to the nontraded sector. Finally, it can be asked how important internationalist norms and institutions were in facilitating the postwar liberalizing turn in international trade policies (Goldstein, 1993; Ruggie, 1983) . Ideological changes may affect the political mobilization of the normally apathetic nontraded sector. International economic institutions may affect the incentives of exporting sectors to mobilize in favor of free trade.
Evidence from the five largest postwar trading economies shows that most of these factors played a role. Structural economic factors are important in explaining why the postwar policy environment was so strongly protectionist. However, they are less helpful in explaining how the protectionist straitjacket was unraveled. Trade liberalization began in the United States and the FRG and was unilateral in character. This pattern is better explained by military interests in strengthening and reassuring allies and was facilitated by relatively favorable structural conditions and coalitional side payments to agriculture. Internationalist norms influenced public opinion. But it is unlikely that they could have prevailed against opposing nationalist and interventionist norms in the absence of relatively favorable economic, military, and coalitional conditions. International institutions had the potential to strengthen free-trading political forces, but they could not operate to this effect until the late 1950s.
The next section discusses the structural and military consequences of world war and generates hypotheses about their trade policy consequences. It also discusses how changing coalition patterns, concentrations of legislative power, economic ideologies, and international economic institutions may affect trade policy outcomes. Subsequent sections summarize postwar trade policy changes in the five large trading states and then discuss the impact of changes in the independent variables. The final section summarizes the findings and makes a brief comparison with the period after World War I. It then discusses implications for the current process of economic globalization and suggests some possibilities for future research. Kindleberger (1973) , in his landmark work on the Depression, famously noted that "the world economic system was unstable unless some country stabilized it. . . . When every country turned to protect its national private interest, the world public interest went down the drain" (p. 292). The related "hegemonic stability" literature has sought to determine when large states can be expected to "stabilize" the international economy out of perceived self-interest. The dimension of international stabilization being addressed here is maintaining relatively limited trade barriers. National military interests are one possible source of stabilizing trade policies. National economic self-interest is another possibility, though a more ambiguous one. First, it is possible that large states can manipulate international relative prices in their favor by protecting their home markets. More important, trade policies rarely seem to be determined by national economic interest calculations (Vousden, 1990, pp. 84-104, 177-199) . More commonly, they seem to emerge from political competition among subnational groups with diverging economic interests.
HOW WORLD WAR INFLUENCES TRADE POLICY
Consider first how economic structure and subnational interest groups influence trade policy through the political system. In an international trade model where both capital and labor cannot be used at comparably low cost outside of their specific sectors, the expected cleavage over trade policy pits protectionist industries against free-trading ones. Changes in trade policy are influenced by changes in sectoral trade policy preferences and in the relative size of sectors in terms of GDP or employment shares.
3
The nontraded "consumer" sector has weaker preferences and is more difficult to organize, and hence is usually assumed to be a marginal political force in the trade policy arena. 4 World war would be expected to affect industries' trade policy preferences and relative industry sizes through three main mechanisms: changes in production and trade patterns, in foreign asset stocks, and in exchange rates.
How are world wars expected to influence international production and trade patterns? First, there are direct production-and trade-diverting effects between rival blocs. Trade between the two military blocs, including trade with neutrals "isolated" within each bloc, mostly ceases. Demand hitherto supplied from the other bloc is to a large extent supplied from within each bloc. This is largely an import substitution process-although there is also some replacement through intrabloc exports. After the war is over, combatant production recovers in areas of ex ante specific capital and labor investments, and there tends to be a net increase in aggregate supply relative to aggregate demand. Within each bloc, there are further production-and trade-diverting effects. Combatants shift resources hitherto used in the traded sector over to war production. Much of the resulting deficit will be made up by an increase in production among neutrals. Again, this is largely an import substitution process-although there is also some replacement through intrabloc exports. After the war is over, combatant production will recover in the traded sector in areas of ex ante specific capital and labor investments, tending to produce a net increase in aggregate supply relative to aggregate demand.
These mechanisms tend to increase the relative size of import-competing sectors. Import substitution diverts resources into the import-competing sec-
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3. In the factor proportions model of international trade, relatively scarce factors of production benefit from protection, whereas relatively abundant factors of production benefit from free trade (or export subsidies). In the specific factors model, specific capital in import-competing sectors benefits from protection, specific capital in exporting sectors from free trade (or export subsidies). (Mobile labor's preference on trade policy depends on the marginal utility of consuming exported as opposed to imported goods.) In what might be termed the "strong specific factors model," labor is also taken to be sector-specific and has the same trade policy preference as capital in its sector. The operating assumption here is that preferences for protection or free trade are unlikely to reflect the interests of the average manager or worker. Rather, they are likely to reflect the specific, typically high adjustment and mobility costs faced by capital and labor in each sector. In most cases, then, the strong specific factors model is likely to be a better predictor of trade policy preferences than the factor proportions or specific factors models (Dixit & Norman, 1980, pp. 86-87, 102-110; Frey, 1984, chap. 2; Magee, Brock, & Young, 1989, chap. 7) . For recent discussions, see Alt and Gilligan (1994) and Milner (1997). tors-sometimes at the expense of the exporting sectors. On the other hand, development of additional export capacity, primarily among neutrals, does not produce an offsetting expansion of exporting sectors. After the war, new import-substituting and exporting capacity will be added to preexisting capacity, world market prices will fall, and a share of overall export capacity roughly corresponding to the wartime increase in productive capacity will turn out to be uncompetitive and hence import-competing ex post. Conceivably, given neutrals or even given combatants might experience expansions of viable exporting capacity that exceed the extent of import substitution. However, because the aggregate relative size of import-competing sectors is increasing, such a result would only occur at the expense of larger-thanaverage shifts in favor of import-competing sectors in other countries.
Some additional refinements merit discussion here. Whether a given sector has net importing or net exporting status on the foreign trade account is an imperfect indicator of its trade policy preferences. The more fundamental determinants of trade policy preferences are present and expected costs relative to foreign competitors, and the size of the domestic market relative to total output. Without a significant comparative advantage and/or with a large home market-even where the sector is net exporting-the ability to raise prices on the internal market is likely to be more attractive, relative to any alternative gains likely from granting market access at home in exchange for greater access abroad. Thus it is not uncommon for large net-exporting sectors in relative decline to be protectionist and, to a lesser extent, for netimporting sectors on the rise to be free trading.
5
In other words, it is probably more accurate to imagine the dividing line between protectionist and freetrading sectors to fall, on average, somewhere into the range of net-exporting sectors. In the present context, the point also bears on when sectors can be expected to reverse their trade policy preferences. So far, the discussion of the effects of war has emphasized the tendency of import-competing sectors to grow and exporting sectors to shrink. However, on the margin, there should also be a greater tendency for hitherto free-trading sectors to shift their preferences to protection than the opposite.
5. Similarly, sectors may be internally divided to a significant extent. Although it is not possible to gather information on every firm exposed to the international market, sectors with significant internal divisions should have difficulty agreeing on a common trade policy position. Such was the case, for example, with the British iron and steel industry in the 1920s. However, there is little evidence of such internal divisions in the large trading states after World War II.
6. In cases where this protectionist shift takes place while the given sector is still a net exporter, protection alone is not sufficient to raise the domestic price above the world market price. Here the given sector will also self-organize or lobby the government to impose marketing controls. Such controls are necessary to prevent arbitrage from eliminating the projected price difference between domestic and international market prices.
There are also important financial effects of war involving changes in foreign asset holdings and exchange rates. Banks and other lenders with owncurrency-denominated foreign assets tend to prefer free trade, because this facilitates foreign debt repayments. Combatants would be expected to draw down their foreign assets and/or build up foreign debts, whereas neutrals would be expected to build up foreign assets and/or draw down foreign debts. How does the exchange rate affect trade policy? An overvalued currency will make the entire traded sector less competitive and might shift the trade policy preferences of marginal sectors from free trade to protection. This will tend to strengthen the protectionist coalition relative to the free-trading coalition, and therefore tend to increase protection. An undervalued exchange rate might have the opposite effect. It is difficult to predict which countries are more likely to have overvalued or undervalued currencies following the war.
7
But the effects of revealed postwar overvaluation and undervaluation can be taken into account.
In the period after World War II per se, one would expect the structural effects through production-and trade-diversion and changes in foreign investment stocks to be relatively limited. This is because similar shocks due to World War I and the Depression had already pushed a once extensive international division of labor and investment network a long way back toward national self-sufficiency and exclusive trading blocs. On the other hand, the same reasoning implies that initial conditions should strongly favor protectionist sectoral coalitions. Given the postwar strength and scope of exchange and trade controls, exchange rate overvaluation and undervaluation would also be expected to have more limited impacts on sectoral competitiveness.
Hypothesis 1: War-induced trade diversion, along with any reductions in foreign asset holdings and exchange rate overvaluations, will increase the size of protectionist (mostly import-competing) sectors relative to the size of free-trading (mostly exporting) sectors-although the process is likely to be spread unevenly across countries. Increases in the relative size of protectionist coalitions are expected to be limited by their already large advantages at the outset of World War II.
Consider now military explanation of trade policy changes. In the postwar period, the pattern of military alliances and rivalries is likely to vary-albeit unpredictably. How does this matter? Consider two levels of analysis for pur-poses of assessing military interests: (a) initial readiness levels, for purposes of winning or avoiding defeat in the early stages of war; and (b) readily mobilizable capabilities relevant to achieving victory in a protracted war (Hirschman, 1980; Srinivasan, 1987) .
If military spending and mobilization capacity are increasing in GDP, there is a military interest in the strength of allied economies and hence in free trade with allies. Exporting sectors have an interest in reciprocal free trade, because they benefit primarily from access to foreign markets. A freetrade policy driven by exporting-sector economic interests should therefore make access to the home market conditional on reciprocal access to foreign markets. By contrast, military interests in free trade are unilateral. That is, even if one's ally does not grant any reciprocal access, there is still a gain in aggregate outputs as a result of one-sided trade liberalization.
What about trade with rivals? There may not be an interest in the weakness of rival economies, and hence in protection against rivals, if interdependence means that hurting a rival economy also hurts one's own economy. Such an interest in the weakness of rival economies exists if enemy gains from trade are much greater or, what is more likely, if an enemy experiences greater indirect military benefits or smaller indirect military costs of trade.
The most important indirect effects are on initial military readiness levels and on productive capacity to prosecute a protracted war. Asymmetric effects on initial readiness levels are typically limited to trade in a narrow range of goods of relatively direct military application. More important, effects on productive capacity to prosecute a protracted war may occur where comparative advantage produces significant specialization in broadly strategic sectors-notably, in heavy industry (e.g., steel, machinery, transport equipment, chemicals) and possibly also in essential foodstuffs and raw materials. Countries that would not specialize sufficiently in these sectors might face a significant disadvantage in a protracted war and thus might have a military interest in protecting these sectors (Dixit & Norman, 1980, pp. 180-182). 8 Although war-induced changes in the pattern of military alliances and rivalries cannot be predicted a priori, the revealed changes and their likely effects on trade policy preferences can be examined. Although the Cold War did not develop immediately, it had by the later 1940s strongly divided the Soviet Union from the other great powers and created strong alliances between the United States, Britain, France, and the FRG and between the United States and Japan. There was also initially a tension within the United States-Western Europe alliance because France feared a revived Germany and did not trust Britain and the United States to come to her rescue. The largest indirect military benefits of trade liberalization would predictably come from a U.S. trade liberalization vis-à-vis Britain, France, the FRG, and Japan. Unexpectedly, the FRG's explosive economic recovery from 1948 also opened up a trade policy front in the FRG government's efforts to establish cooperative relations with Western Europe and particularly France. Some related features of the political mechanism and process should also be kept in mind. One is that coalitions will not necessarily form in a way that pits all protectionist industries against all free-trading industries. Protectionist coalitions may support free trade for selected industries, particularly if the support of such industries is not necessary politically and if important protectionist industries are large consumers of such industries.
10
Potentially more important, side payments can be used to create larger, more heterogeneous coalitions, to assure political victory, and increase expected economic gains. What variations on a straight division of protectionist versus free-trading sectors are most likely? The main barrier to heterogeneous coalitions is the possible use of "salami tactics" by the dominant partners, that is, one type of sector only pays off some sectors of the other type until it has sufficiently weakened their allies to renege on the payoffs. Only the largest and most influential sectors-those capable of defending their interests without much aid from other sectors-can ignore this commitment problem.
Economic ideologies are presumably unlikely to alter the trade policy preferences of traded sector industries, which are strongly and directly affected by trade policy. However, they may have some impact on nontraded sector opinion. This is probably most likely when important events change 134 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / March 2004 9. One would also expect the USSR to draw back from unrestricted trade with her more advanced rivals, but the nature of the Soviet planned economy foreclosed the possibility of significant trade to begin with.
10. For example, highly uncompetitive raw-material-producing sectors are almost invariably excluded from protectionist coalitions that include significant manufacturing industries. the relative appeal of relevant competing ideologies, in this case those of economic internationalism and economic nationalism. The cataclysmic economic consequences of the world wars and the Depression appear if anything to have strengthened economic nationalism. Economic internationalism prevailed before these events and so was to some extent discredited through a guilt-by-association process (Eichengreen, 1992; Kindleberger, 1973; Milward, 1984) .
11
This could be an additional factor favoring protectionism after World War II. But nontraded sector opinion is not liable to be highly selective about the form in which its general aspirations for change are embodied as long as any new policies seem to work somewhat better. As long as the new policies do not coincide with a general economic deterioration, this allows other forces to "catch the wave" and shape the specifics of trade policy change to their liking.
Political systems with more fragmented party systems may be more permeable to sectoral interests, whereas catch-all parties may better reflect the interests of larger, more dispersed groups such as the nontraded sector. A greater number of formal and informal veto points in the legislative process may have similar effects. More formal veto points-multiple legislatures and veto-wielding presidencies-will often make it harder to push through legislative changes. So may informal veto points created by heterogeneous multiparty coalitions and intraparty ideological diversity. If changes do occur under such conditions, they are more likely to require greater compromise with various smaller special interest groups (Haggard & Kaufman, 1992; Tsebelis, 1995) . 12 However, in the trade policy arena as in others, such institutional effects depend on the balance of power between the most directly concerned interest groups-here the protectionist and free-trading sectoral coalitions-as well as the salience of the issue to other groups-here the nontraded sector.
International institutions can lower the transaction costs and risks associated with international trade. They can also facilitate the international bargaining process by which domestic trade barriers are reduced conditional upon foreign reductions. Both effects increase the gains from trade and thus are expected to mobilize exporting sectors more strongly in favor of free trade. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had the potential to increase the gains from trade in this manner. The IMF sought to do so by stabilizing exchange rates and thus minimizing fluctuation in international relative prices. The GATT sought to do so by establishing trade-friendly rules for international economic transactions and by centralizing negotiations on reciprocal trade barrier reduction. However, the functioning of such institutions depends on favorable engagement by a critical mass of large trading states (Kenwood & Lougheed, 1999, pp. 237-298) .
Hypothesis 4: Coalitional side payments, economic ideologies, fragmentation of institutional power, and international economic institutions may have additional effects on the relative size and effectiveness of protectionist and freetrading political forces.
CHANGES IN TRADE POLICIES AFTER WORLD WAR II
In Britain after World War II, the high manufactures tariffs of the 1930s were overlaid with an even more stringent network of trade and exchange controls-which remained in place until the mid-to late 1950s. The controls also intensified preferences for the large commonwealth bloc of former colonies (Dow, 1970, pp. 153-158, 171, 174; Sargent, 1952a Sargent, , 1952b .
In France, a rigorous trade control regime was only gradually dismantled in the postwar period. All imports competing with domestically produced foodstuffs and manufactures were severely restricted. Even limited efforts at intra-European liberalization were restricted by tariff increases and periodic reimposition of controls and were only made on a deeper, lasting basis from 1957 (Baum, 1958, pp. 96-103, 266-268, 339-341) .
In Japan, once private trade was restored in 1949-1950, controls heavily restricted all foodstuffs and manufactures competitive with domestic products. Controls were retained long after the mid-1950s, when foreign trade barriers began to move downward. In contrast to the post-World War I period, rice farmers were also rigorously protected, and once relative agricultural prices turned down after 1951, provided with price supports (Cohen, 1958, p. 130; Hayami, 1972, pp. 22-26; Yamazawa, 1990, pp. 166-168, 172-179) .
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In the United States, notwithstanding the limited tariff reductions negotiated in the latter Roosevelt administration, prewar tariffs remained at the high levels of the 1922 Fordney-McCumber Tariff. With the significant exception of agriculture, trade barriers were dramatically cut after World War II. Strict exchange and trade control regimes outside the dollar zone meant that these tariff reductions were almost entirely unilateral through the late 1950s (Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 888) .
In the FRG, although extensive trade controls initially prevailed, liberalization moved forward gradually from the early 1950s. This liberalization was for the most part unilateral. Quotas on nondollar trade were largely removed in 1952 -1954 . In 1956 , quotas on dollar trade and tariffs generally were lowered dramatically. However, strict quotas remained on agricultural imports (Milward, 1992, pp. 143-145, 220-222; Wallich, 1955, pp. 230-240) .
What is the overall pattern? High prewar levels of protection prevailed in all five countries. After World War II, these levels increased in the relatively less capital-abundant cases of Britain, France, and Japan. On the other hand, they decreased significantly in the United States and somewhat later in the FRG-although agriculture continued to be strongly protected in both countries. The trade barrier reductions in the United States and the FRG were both largely unilateral, that is, were not conditional on trade barrier reductions abroad and were not reciprocated significantly by their primary trading partners.
CHANGES IN NATIONAL MILITARY INTERESTS
Immediately after the end of World War II, the main security threats were perceived as coming from a revisionist Germany or Japan. Occupation regimes were implanted for indefinite stays. Beyond disarmament, limits on military potential were imposed through controls on industrial production. The United States announced that the bulk of its forces would be withdrawn from Europe within two years. However, multiplying disputes with the Soviet Union soon changed the situation. These disputes included Soviet political controls imposed on Eastern European states occupied by the Red Army as well as political and military pressure on Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Most significantly, the Soviets refused to abide by the agreement to maintain a unified Germany and instead created a separate state in their eastern occupation zone. The United States and Britain also worried that the desperate economic situation in Western Europe could bring already huge Moscowcentered communist parties to power in France and Italy. With the outbreak of the Cold War in 1946-1947, U.S. priorities quickly changed. Talk of withdrawing U.S. troops ended. Economic and military aid programs were expanded and focused on military allies. Occupation regimes in Japan and in the U.S. and British zones in Germany were reoriented. Japan and Western
Germany were now to be mobilized in a common effort to contain the USSR. Independence was gradually restored to the Japanese and FRG governments, and economic and later military controls were lifted. The process culminated when occupation regimes were formally terminated and replaced with treaties of mutual defense against the Soviet threat (Grosser, 1955; Storry, 1984, pp. 238-258; Wheeler-Bennett & Nicholls, 1974, pp. 419-604) .
As part of the process of forming the anti-Soviet alliance and shoring up the economic and political stability of allies, U.S. trade policy turned away from its traditional emphasis on the nondiscrimination norm and on bargaining for reciprocal market access. The United States now adopted a unilateral free-trade policy toward Western Europe and Japan, even though there was little possibility of it being reciprocated for many years. Moreover, the United States soon began to make a large proportion of Marshall aid conditional upon nondiscrimination in trade and payments within Western Europe. Above all, this meant equal treatment of the FRG-the United States's primary competitor in the worldwide market for capital-intensive manufactures exports (Milward, 1984) .
These developments fundamentally transformed Franco-German relations. Initially, France viewed Germany as a much greater threat than the Soviet Union and did not trust the United States and Britain to protect her. France emphasized cooperation with Moscow to restrain Germany and later resisted the United States-led liberalization of the occupation regime. The famous Monnet Plan of investment in heavy industry and infrastructure originated as an effort to transfer the largest concentration of continental heavy industry from Germany to France, with Germany to be kept subordinated as a semi-industrialized raw material supplier and product market. This strategy collapsed after the occupation regime was dismantled in Western Germany. The newly unleashed FRG economy was soon growing much faster than that of France (Lynch, 1984) .
This was the basis for a new arrangement in Franco-German relations and a new path towards European integration. Konrad Adenauer's FRG government wanted to anchor Germany to Western Europe for three main reasons: to bury Germany's aggressive nationalist past, to prevent any "neutralization" of all Germany through a deal with the USSR, and to obtain Western European support for the ultimate reunification of Germany under the "Western" government. France's postwar coalition governments sought aid in subsidizing and fostering French industry and wanted Germany to be contained and domesticated through pan-European and bilateral arrangements. The FRG initially pursued its strategy through unilateral trade liberalization vis-à-vis Western Europe. Later, reconciled French and German goals served as the basis for agreements on a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1951) and a European Economic Community (EEC) (1957) . These agreements restrained German competition in the militarily strategic coal-andsteel sector and, informally, in other strategic industries. The EEC also provided generous subsidies to France through the Common Agricultural Policy and imposed relatively high common external trade barriers. This explains why the FRG's free-trading coalition and the government's economics ministries unsuccessfully opposed the ECSC and the EEC agreements on economic grounds. Similarly, France's overwhelmingly protectionist industry was unhappy with the agreements' future potential to introduce relatively uncontrolled competition within Europe (De Carmoy, 1970; Milward, 1984; Verdier, 1994, pp. 218-222; Willis, 1968) .
Hypothesis 3 on the negative security externalities of trade receives support from the manner in which France initially sought to build up her coal and steel and related strategic industries, while holding down German production in the same industries. It is also supported by the way the FRG later accepted formal and informal restrictions on competition in these industries to reassure France. Hypothesis 2 on positive security externalities of trade is supported by the timing and unilateral character of trade liberalization in the United States and the FRG. At first, the United States emphasized more equal, improved access for its own exporters. With the outbreak of the Cold War, the United States made deep, unilateral reductions. Within a few more years, the FRG had acquired political autonomy and a new economic ascendance in Western Europe. This was used to provide unilateral economic benefits to France and other Western European countries in exchange for political normalization and support for the Adenauer government's agenda for Germany's future. Notably, unilateral free-trade policies were pursued by the two most economically dynamic countries, that is, in the cases where they provided the greatest economic benefit and also the greatest potential indirect military benefit. Although there were also rationales based on security externalities for Britain, Japan, and later France to provide greater market access to allies, the expected indirect military benefits were much smaller.
CHANGES IN SECTORAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS
In Britain by the late 1930s, the manufactures specialization had become much more capital intensive and self-sufficient than it had been before World War I. The traditional dependence of labor-intensive exporting sectors (textiles, steel, shipbuilding) on foreign markets had declined, and the importcompeting capital-intensive sectors (chemicals, electrical machinery, autos) had expanded. Therefore, World War II had a more limited impact, mainly in producing a further expansion of the machinery sector. Continued losses in traditional export markets, particularly in textiles, further eroded the postwar value-added shares of labor-intensive manufactures.
14 Though the laborintensive sectors remained net exporters, their competitiveness was in decline. They preferred to monopolize home and, to a lesser extent, commonwealth markets to risking competition under reciprocal free-trade arrangements. The import-competing advanced sectors, continuing to fear U.S. and German competition, had long been protectionist. To these industry-level changes were added huge wartime losses of foreign assets. The pound is generally considered to have been somewhat overvalued in the postwar period, but there is no indication that this was sufficient to alter the trade policy preferences of any significant sectors. Not surprisingly, after World War II there was a consensus in favor of manufactures protection among Britain's traded sector industries-as there had been since the mid-1930s. The financial sector had dropped its opposition to protection in the early 1930s, and the limited foreign assets that remained after World War II were concentrated in the commonwealth trading bloc (Abel, 1945; Matthews, Feinstein, & OdlingSmee, 1982, pp. 222, 239; Milward, 1984, pp. 396-433; Mitchell, 1988 Mitchell, , p. 429, 1992 Streeten, 1962) .
In France, the German occupation limited wartime changes in the structure of manufactures production. Yet there were significant losses of overseas markets for traditional textile exports. After the war, the fastest growth occurred in the capital-intensive, home-market-oriented chemicals, machinery, and transport sectors. The more export-oriented textiles sectors languished, while metals received some impetus from the Monnet Plan's strategic emphasis on coal and steel.
15
Foreign asset holdings, which were not large to begin with before World War II, fell moderately. The franc was periodically overvalued, but there is no evidence that this changed any sectoral trade policy preferences. As in Britain, there was a protectionist consensus among declining, labor-intensive exporting industries and rising, capital-intensive import-competing industries. Agriculture was far larger than in Britain and remained strongly protectionist (Baum, 1958, pp. 18-71, 96-103, 266-268, 
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14. Yearly figures are not available. From 1935 to 1948, the combined share of the more labor-intensive textiles and metals sectors fell from 27.5% of total manufactures value added to 25.9%, whereas the combined share of the more capital-intensive machinery, transport equipment, and related products sectors rose from 29.1% to 37.6% (Mitchell, 1988, p. 429) .
15. Yearly figures are not available. From 1938 to 1949, the value-added national income shares of the more labor-intensive textiles, clothing, and leather sector fell from 9.4% to 8.5%, that of the relatively labor-intensive metals sector rose from 1.6% to 2.4%, and those of more capital-intensive chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment rose from 10.9% to 14.9% (Carré, Dubois, & Malinvaud, 1975, pp. 509-519, 546-547). 339-341; Carré, Dubois, & Malinvaud, 1975, pp. 21-34, 395-407, 509-519; Caron, 1979, pp. 179-182, 216-218, 232-238, 326-327; Ehrmann, 1957, pp. 401-417; Lynch, 1984; Mitchell, 1992, p. 913) .
For Japan, mobilization for war began in earnest in the mid-1930s-and hence lasted for something like a decade. So it is not surprising that there was massive growth of import-competing, protectionist metals, machinery, and chemicals relative to net-exporting, free-trading textiles. This produced a large relative advance of the protectionist sectoral coalition. The protectionist agriculture sector shrank somewhat, but remained huge. 16 However, in the interwar period, the imperial military regime had imposed intra-empire free trade to achieve food self-sufficiency, exposing the Japanese agricultural sector to competition from Korea and Taiwan. With the end of the military regime and the loss of the empire, the agricultural sector was freed to mobilize for protection of the domestic market. Although not evident in the external accounts, loss of the empire also represented a significant loss of foreign asset holdings. However, these holdings were primarily direct investments aimed at increasing empire self-sufficiency. As such, they did not represent a stake in open markets. The yen was somewhat undervalued in the postwar period, although again, there is no evidence that this affected sectoral trade policy preferences. As before the war, textiles was the only significant freetrading sector. Its relative size declined rapidly during Japan's more protracted period of conflict, and military interests no longer constrained agriculture from mobilizing for protection. The already large prewar advantage of the protectionist coalition was increased significantly (Allen, 1958; Cohen, 1958; Yamazawa, 1975 Yamazawa, , 1990 .
In the United States the war produced surges across the entire traded sector, but the largest were in metals and capital-intensive manufacturesparticularly machinery-rather than in agriculture and textiles. intensive manufacturing industries supported free trade, whereas laborintensive industries (particularly textiles and metals) and agriculture favored continued protection. In contrast to the post-World War I pattern, wartime and postwar capital outflows were overwhelmingly sovereign and concessionary and hence did not significantly enlarge creditor interests. Postwar undervaluation of the dollar benefited traded sector competitiveness. This had little impact in the prevailing environment of heavy trade and exchange controls, and there is no evidence that it changed the trade policy preferences of any important sectors (Bureau of the Census, 1975, pp. 224, 481, 666, 670-679, 864, 866-867; Wilkinson, 1960) . The war thus increased the relative size of the free-trading, capital-intensive manufactures coalition relative to the protectionist coalition of labor-intensive manufactures and agriculture. However, the protectionist coalition, which had handily won the political struggle in the interwar period, remained quite large. The prewar German economy was already relatively self-sufficient, so the war did not produce dramatic structural changes. But the postwar partition severed eastern regions specializing in protectionist agriculture and laborintensive consumer goods (textiles, miscellaneous manufactures), leaving the rump FRG with a heightened concentration in traditionally protectionist metals and in free-trading chemicals, machinery, and transport equipment. But the traditionally protectionist coal and steel sector was controlled and its output restricted, initially by the occupation authorities and later by ECSC market-sharing arrangements. The relative size of the free-trading, capitalintensive sectors was further increased by the FRG's explosive economic recovery and later on by the U.S.-brokered intra-European liberalization initiatives.
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Foreign asset holdings were largely unchanged, having been mostly lost in World War I. The mark's undervaluation bolstered traded sector competitiveness but did not alter trade policy preferences of any important sectors. The biggest impact was produced not by the war but by the postwar partition, occupation regime, and externally facilitated recovery policies. But all of these factors contributed to the relative economic decline of the still large, traditionally successful protectionist coalition of agriculture, textiles, and coal and steel (De Carmoy, 1970; Hoffmann, 1965, pp. 33, 151-159, 392- 
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18. For manufacturing, only production indices for selected years are available (1913 = 100). Prewar figures are for Germany, postwar figures for the FRG. Textiles, clothing, mining, and metals, respectively, went from 83. 6, 103.8, 115.8, and 99.2 in 1936 to 60.2, 82.7, 74.5, and 63.7 in 1950 and to 90.7, 108.8, 124.9, and 112.6 in 1955 . Metal working and chemicals, respectively, went from 202.6 and 234.8 in 1936 to 137.1 and 240.6 in 1950 and to 305.7 and 439.8 in 1955 (Hoffmann, 1965 ). Agriculture's share of the workforce was 26.0% in 1939 and for West and East Germany in 1950 was 18.7% and 26.0%, respectively (Mitchell, 1975, p. 164) . 395, 522-523, 534-535; Milward, 1992, pp. 134-167; Wallich, 1955, pp. 40-42, 194-207; Willis, 1968) .
What is the overall pattern of change? In Britain, France, and Japan, protectionist coalitions increased their already large prewar advantages over free-trading coalitions. In Britain and France these protectionist coalitions included large, though declining, net-exporting sectors concerned to monopolize domestic markets. In the United States and the FRG, there was a relative decline of protectionist coalitions that in the prewar period had been somewhat larger than their free-trading rivals. There is thus considerable but not unqualified support for Hypothesis 1. War-induced trade diversion did tend to increase the relative size of protectionist coalitions in the less capitalabundant trading states. As would be expected, this was most pronounced in Japan, which began with the least self-sufficient economy and was at war for the longest time. Moreover, the free-trade-friendly productive changes in the FRG were due more to the partition and the Cold War-related evolution of the occupation regime than to the war. On the other hand, productive changes in the United States were relatively favorable for the free-trading coalition.
CHANGES IN COALITION FORMATION PATTERNS, ECONOMIC IDEOLOGIES, DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
What were the most significant post-World War II changes in coalition formation patterns? In the United States and the FRG, protectionist agricultural sectors were offered protection by free-trading sectors and hence detached from the protectionist coalition. Because of the still huge size of the agricultural sectors, this produced much larger changes in the relative size of the protectionist and free-trading coalitions than did structural economic changes. Moreover, these changes occurred in countries with relatively evenly matched protectionist and free-trading coalitions in which the agricultural sectors had been the dominant political forces within successful interwar protectionist movements (Gerschenkron, 1989, pp. 89-163; Taussig, 1964, pp. 447-526) .
Around the world, late Depression-era economic ideologies, which emphasized state control and intervention to preserve stability and employment, remained much more influential than their liberal, internationalist, integrationist rivals. Such economic nationalist ideologies were particularly influential in Europe and Latin America. After World War II, for example, Britain and France used them to justify strict exchange and trade control regimes, as well as preferential trading blocs that included existing and former colonies and important bilateral trading partners (Baum, 1958; Dow, 1970; Milward, 1984) . But the question is whether such ideologies have significant independent power in explaining trade policy preferences, especially among nontraded sector groups.
The examples of the United States and the FRG raise doubts. These countries experienced much more dramatic economic collapses during the Depression and hence should have been more susceptible to economic nationalist ideologies. Yet it soon became clear that strongly protectionist trade policy regimes shut U.S. products out of most of the world market outside of Latin America, and thus created an important barrier to economic recovery. The Roosevelt administration duly altered its initial economic nationalist orientation to emphasize the principle of nondiscrimination and to bargain for reciprocal access to important foreign markets. During World War II, these U.S. interests led to efforts to create multilateral economic institutions to advance exchange rate stability and reciprocal trade barrier reductions. In the FRG, Adenauer's Christian Democratic administration embraced economic internationalism as a means to embed Germany in the Western European family of nations and to recover East Germany from Soviet control. None of these U.S. and FRG governments would have sacrificed economic stability to pursue economic internationalist ideological goals for their own sake. But there was no necessary inconsistency as long as internationalist instruments could coexist with economic stability and policies thought to promote such stability-including protection of politically pivotal sectors such as agriculture. In post-World War II Japan, there is little evidence of any consistent emphasis on economic nationalism or internationalism, but rather only pragmatic pursuit of restored political independence and economic growth (Haggard, 1988; Johnson, 1982; Milward, 1984; Postan, 1967, pp. 90-114) . Economic nationalism was ascendant in the post-World War II world. This made trade protection easier to justify. However, as long as economic stability persisted, economic nationalism did not threaten to activate large portions of the nontraded sector capable of overriding any significant economic and military interests in trade liberalization.
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How divided were governing coalitions and what effect did this have on trade policy? In the immediate postwar period, the United States and Britain and the second FRG administration were governed by catch-all parties, Japan by a two-party coalition, and France and the first FRG administration by multiparty coalitions. However, the coalition parties in Japan and the FRG were relatively homogeneous in their trade policy preferences. Even in France, despite significant general ideological differences among the coalition parties, this was no strong difference of opinion on trade policy. Finally, there was also some heterogeneity within each of the poorly disciplined U.S. catch-all parties. Thus substantive ideological differentiation of governing coalitions over trade policy was probably most limited in Britain but was also relatively limited in the other four countries. There is little evidence that such limited substantive differentiation of trade policy preferences among coalition members had much of an impact on trade policy outcomes. The main disagreements occurred within the more free-trading governments-the United States and the FRG-over making a protectionist exception for agriculture. The size and political influence of the agricultural sector was such that important dissenting members of some ruling coalitions-some representatives of more urban constituencies and states in the U.S. catch-all parties and the Free Democrats in the FRG-had little chance of imposing free trade on agriculture (Berghahn, 1987, pp. 197-216, 302; Johnson, 1982; Milward, 1992; Wilkinson, 1960; Williams, 1964) .
A more fundamental change, of course, was the transition to democracy in Japan. This put policy making under the control of a broadly accountable government. Since before World War I, a narrow military clique had imposed intra-empire agricultural free trade to enhance food self-sufficiency in the event of war. Military defeat eliminated the empire, and democracy made agriculture the sector most certain to receive trade protection. To summarize, the main effect of regime change on Japan's trade policy was to give economic interests more prominence. Here there was a dominant protectionist coalition that extended trade protection to cover agriculture as well as industry. Another important institutional change was the U.S. 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA). This gave presidents the authority to make reciprocal trade barrier reduction agreements, which then had to be approved or denied by Congress without amendment. This made it easier to limit the influence of protectionist elements of the two major parties. However, once agriculture was coopted into the free-trading coalition, these protectionist elements were severely weakened. The RTAA itself had to be renewed by Congress. And the RTAA provided no guarantee that trade policy would not remain dominated by protectionist interest groups, as it continued to be from 1934 until the outbreak of World War II. During that period, there was no political contradiction between maintaining high trade barriers and bargaining selectively for greater access to promising foreign markets (Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 888; Destler, 1995, pp. 3-38) .
International institutions such as the IMF and the GATT, had they operated effectively, had the potential to enhance the political mobilization of free-trading sectors. However, because of the exchange and trade control regimes operated through the late 1950s in most of Europe and even into the early 1970s in Japan, these institutions could not operate as intended until the late 1950s at the earliest. Widespread discriminatory exchange-control regimes made international trade relations highly unpredictable, more so than even highly volatile exchange rates would have been in a world of convertible payments and more limited trade preferences. Similarly, extensive exchange and trade controls made most tariff reductions nonbinding and ineffectual. Nor, in the mid-to late 1940s, was there any indication that this situation would change in the near future (Milward, 1984; Triffin, 1957) . Thus the IMF and the GATT could not have had the kinds of significant mobilizing effects that are sometimes claimed for them in later periods of freer international trade and payments.
Among the additional factors considered in this section, it is only variation in coalition formation patterns that had a significant impact on trade policy changes. Moreover, in the two major countries that defied the protectionist tendencies of the period, the defection of protectionist agricultural sectors to the free-trading coalitions had much larger impacts than structural economic changes.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The most important factors influencing post-World War II trade policy changes in the five large trading states can now be summarized. Beginning with World War I and continuing through the Depression and World War II, structural economic changes played a central role in reversing the pre-World War I tide of globalization. But these protectionist structural economic tendencies were least advanced in the more capital-intensive economies of the United States and the FRG. During and after World War II, the most important changes in the balance of power between protectionist and free-trading coalitions were produced not by uneven structural economic changes but rather by side payments to agriculture in the United States and the FRG. However, strong military interests in free trade with allies best explain the unilateral form of U.S. and FRG trade policy liberalization. In the United States, these changed international trade policy from the traditional sectoral economic interest-oriented emphasis on bargaining for reciprocal access. They even led the United States to go so far as to pay Western Europe countries to import more from the FRG, the chief international competitor of U.S. manufacturing. In the FRG, military interests in free trade eventually led to policies that subsidized France-while France in turn was subsidizing indus-tries designed to compete with those of the FRG-and restricted competition within the EEC. The FRG's free-trading sectors and her economics ministries actively but unsuccessfully opposed these subsidies and restrictions.
Briefly, how does this appear to compare with the trade policy effects of World War I? Due to the higher level of international specialization prevailing before World War I, war-related structural economic changes added more to the relative size of protectionist coalitions. Moreover, war-related changes in military interests had a more limited and more protectionist impact on trade policy-principally in impelling France and Japan to protect strategic sectors that would have suffered from international competition. None of the other factors considered above appears to have had significant impacts on trade policy changes. The protectionist and free-trading coalitions were most evenly matched in the United States and Germany.
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In both countries, freetrading coalitions that were increasingly challenging traditional policies of protection before the war received stinging setbacks. War-related structural changes transformed the traditionally free-trading policy preferences of U.S. agriculture.
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Congressional representatives of agricultural regions spearheaded the interwar tariff increases. War-related structural changes also led Germany's traditionally free-trading, capital-intensive manufacturing industries to despair of regaining access to once-lucrative foreign markets and instead to pursue cartelization in monopolized domestic markets. After World War I, then, the most important effects were again in the United States and Germany, where structural economic changes set back powerful prewar developmental trends that had favored free-trading coalitions (Abel, 1945; Gerschenkron, 1989, pp. 89-163; Haight, 1941; James, 1986; Taussig, 1964, pp. 447-526; Yamazawa, 1975) .
Does the analysis of the effects of World War II have any implications for the current wave of economic globalization? As Western Europe and Japan recovered from wartime devastation and instability over the first two postwar decades, military interests in free trade declined significantly. They were further weakened by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Over the first few decades of our new century, continued economic globalization seems likely to depend on two main factors: the balance between free-trading and protectionist sectoral coalitions and general economic stability. In the United States, Japan, and Britain, free-trading coali-20. The free-trading coalition had a large prewar advantage in Britain, whereas protectionist coalitions had large prewar advantages in France and Japan. Structural economic changes increased the strength of protectionist coalitions in all three countries, but all three saw only marginal increases in trade protection.
21. U.S. agriculture was, of course, net exporting, but exports were of marginal value compared to the potential gains from price supports in the far larger domestic market.
tions have a significant advantage. Even in France and Germany, where protectionist coalitions are larger and more powerful, protectionist policy changes are constrained by hard-to-change EU rules and more free-tradeoriented small countries. Thus current globalization trends seem unlikely to change without a serious deterioration of economic conditions across a number of large trading states.
The analysis of the effects of World War II also suggests at least two areas for further research. A more systematic effort should be made to study side payments aimed at changing the strength of sectoral coalitions. These side payments are most likely to target large sectors with significant independent political power. Such side payments can affect the relative size of sectoral coalitions as much as more widely studied structural economic changes. In the United States, for example, such side payments were later extended from agriculture to textiles, steel, and autos. However, these manufacturing sectors continued to support stronger across-the-board protection. As illustrated by the cases of Britain, France, and Japan above and by developing countries as diverse as Brazil and South Korea, the bulk of the traded sector has at times formed an alliance and received protection and other subsidies. There is a need to better understand such variation and to make it a more central component of the trade policy literature. Second, although military interests appear to have had a dramatic impact on trade policy following World War II, the military interests in free trade prevailing during that period seem to be atypical. Although some military interests in free trade exist at all times, there is reason to suspect that they do not ordinarily play the often dominating role they did after World War II. A related question is whether significant military interests in protection are likely to be a more common phenomenon.
